The paper is concerned with the feedback approach to the deterministic mean field type differential games. Previously, it was shown that suboptimal strategies in the mean field type differential game can constructed based on functions of time and probability satisfying the stability condition. This property realizes the dynamic programming principle for the constant control of one player. We present the infinitesimal form of this condition involving analogs of the directional derivatives. In particular, we obtain the characterization of the value function of the deterministic mean field type differential game in the terms of directional derivatives and the set of directions feasible by virtue of the dynamics of the game.
Introduction
The theory of mean field type differential game studies control systems consisting of a large number of similar agents with the mean field interaction between them governed by two players with opposite purposes. This problem is a natural extension of the theory of mean field type control systems dealing with the case of only one decision maker. Let us emphasize that the state space for the mean field type differential games and the mean field type control systems is the space of probability measures. This space is only metric.
The theory of mean field type control systems started with paper [1] . Nowadays, the mean field field type control theory is developed for the case when the dynamics of each agent is given by SDE (see [9] and reference therein). For such type of systems the necessary optimality conditions based on forward-backward SDEs were obtained in [4] , [11] , [12] . The existence result of the optimal control is also proved [22] . The dynamic programming principle for mean field type control systems was discussed in [10] , [24] , [27] , [28] . Additionally, let us mention papers [14] , [15] concerning with the case of deterministic mean field type control systems.
The mean field type differential games previously were studied in [7] , [16] , [17] . Recall that as in the case of finite dimensional differential games one can formalize mean field type differential game using either nonanticipative or feedback strategies.
A nonanticipative strategy is a mapping assigning to a control of a player a control of the other player satisfying the feasibility condition. Notice that this approach assumes that the players observe the control of each other. The nonanticipative strategies were introduced for the finite dimensional differential game for the mean field type differential games in [18] , [31] . This approach was developed in [16] . In that paper the existence result for the value function is proved and the dynamic programming is presented.
The assumption that the players have information only about the current state leads to the feedback formalization. For the finite dimensional differential game feedback strategies were introduced by Krasovskii and Subbotin [23] . The extension of their approach to the mean field type differential is presented in [7] . The design of feedback strategies can be performed using so called u-and v-stable functions defined on the product of the time interval and the state space and taking values in the set of real values. Given a u-stable (respectively, v-stable) function, the first (respectively, second) player can construct a suboptimal strategy guaranteeing the reward greater (respectively, smaller) than the value of the given function at the initial position [23] (see also [7] for the mean field type differential games). The u-(respectively v-) stability property means that the epigraph (respectively, a Krasovskii Institute of Mathematics and Mechanics, e-mail:ayv@imm.uran.ru hypograph) is viable with respect to the dynamics corresponding to the constant control of the second (respectively, first) player. Notice that the stability property realizes the dynamic programming principle for the frozen control of one player. It is proved that the value function is simultaneously uand v-stable [7] , [23] , [29] .
The approaches based on nonaticipative and feedback strategies should be equivalent. This statement is proved for the case of finite dimensional differential games in [30] . Unfortunately, up to now this equivalence is not obtained for the mean field type differential games.
Recall that the dynamic programming reduces the original control problem to the Hamilton-Jacobi PDE, which has no smooth solution in the general case. In particular, it was proved for the finite dimensional case that the u-stable (respectively, v-stable) function is a supersolution (respectively, subsolution) of the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi equation [29] . For the finite dimensional case one can use two equivalent tools of nonsmooth analysis to define the viscosity solution of the HamiltonJacobi PDE [8] , [19] , [29] , [32] . First is based on sub-and superdifferentials, whereas the second involves directional derivatives.
Nowadays, only the notions of sub-and superdifferentials are introduced for the functions of probability. Lions in [25] proposed the extrinsic approach which is based on the lifting a probability measure to a random variable. The intrinsic definition of sub-and superdifferentials was introduced in [3] . The link between these two approaches is discussed in [21] . Solutions of Hamilton-Jacobi PDEs in the space of probabilities in the framework of the extrinsic approach were studied in [13] , [16] , [20] , [21] , [28] . The intrinsic sub-and superdifferentials were also used for this class of equations (see [14] , [15] , [26] ).
The paper aims to extend the approach involving directional derivatives to the case of mean field type differential games. The main result of the paper is the infinitesimal forms of u-and v-stability properties for the deterministic mean field type differential game expressed in the terms of directional derivatives. This statement is a modification of the famous viability theorem [5] (see also [6] for the viability theorem for the mean field type control systems). In particular, we get the characterization of the value function in the terms of directional derivatives.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the general notation used in the paper. Furthermore, in this section we present the feedback formalization of the deterministic mean field type differential game and recall the link between the stability property and the value function of the game. The main result of the paper is presented in Section 3. Section 4 contains the characterization of flows of propositions produced by distributions of constant controls. This reformulates the stability condition in the terms of differential inclusions. The properties of the shift operator in the space of probabilities used in the proof of the sufficiency part of the viability theorem are given in Section 5. Finally, the sufficiency and necessity parts of the main result are proved in Sections 6, 7 respectively.
Preliminaries
First, let us set down the notation for the paper.
• If (Ω 1 , Σ 1 ), (Ω 2 , Σ 2 ) are measurable spaces, m is a probability on Σ 1 , h : Ω 1 → Ω 2 is measurable, then h # m stands for the push-forward measure defined by the rule:
• Given two metric spaces (X, ρ X ) and (Y, ρ Y ), we assume that the metric on X × Y is
• If (X, ρ X ) is a separable metric space, then P(X) stands the set of Borel probabilities on X. We endow P(X) with the topology of narrow convergence i.e. the sequence of probabilities {m n } ∞ n=1
converges narrowly to m if, for any φ ∈ C b (X),
• P 2 (X) denotes the set of probabilities m ∈ P(X) such that, for some (equivalently, any) x * ∈ X,
• The 2-Wasserstein metric on P 2 (X) is defined as follows: if m 1 , m 2 ∈ P 2 (X), then
where Π(m 1 , m 2 ) stands for the set of transport plans between m 1 and m 2 i.e. probabilities on X × X with the marginals equal to m 1 and m 2 . Notice that if W 2 (m n , m) → 0 as n → ∞, then the sequence {m n } converges to m narrowly. When X is compact, the converse is also true and P 2 (X) is compact itself..
• Denote by Π 0 (m 1 , m 2 ) the set of all plans π ∈ Π(m 1 , m 2 ) minimizing the right-hand side in (1).
• If (X, ρ X ), (Y, ρ Y ) are separable metric spaces, m is a measure on X, then denote by Λ(X, m, Y ) the set of measures on (X × Y ) with the marginal on X equal to m. By the disintegration theorem, given measure α ∈ Λ(X, m, Y ), there exists, a weakly measurable family of probabilities
If α
Conversely, given a weakly measurable family of probabilities α(dy|x), (2) defines the unique measure α ∈ Λ(X, m, Y ). Thus, we will identify a measure α ∈ Λ(X, m, Y ) with the class of equivalence containing families of probabilities α(dy|x) satisfying (2).
• Let m, m
Notice that if m, m ′ and α have the finite second moments, then π * α has also a finite second moment.
• We assume that the state space for each agent is the
• The distance on T d is introduced as follows: for x, y ∈ T d , set
•
• B c denotes the ball in R d of the radius c centered at the origin.
• For s, r ∈ R, s < r, C s,r stands for the set of continuous functions
With some abuse of notation, we denote the distance between x(·), y(·) ∈ C s,r by x(·) − y(·) . Recall that
x(t) − y(t) .
Mean field type differential game
We consider the mean field type differential game with the dynamics of each agent given by
Here m(t) is the distribution of all agents at time t; u(t) (respectively, v(t)) is the control of the first (respectively, second) player acting on the agent; U (respectively, V ) is the control space for the first (respectively, second) player. We assume that the players influence upon the dynamics of each player independently. The purpose of the first (respectively, second) player is to minimize (respectively, maximize) the functional
g(m(T )).
We impose the following condition on the dynamics and the payoff function:
1. the sets U and V are metric compacts; 2. the functions f and g are continuous;
3. the function f is Lipschitz continuous w.r.t. x and m i.e. there exists L > 0 such that, for any 
is a given flow of probabilities, ξ ∈ U, ζ ∈ V are relaxed controls of the first and second player respectively. The corresponding motion of representative agent is a function defined on [s, r] with values in T d solving the following initial value problem:
Below we denote the solution of (5) Now, let us turn to the dynamics of the whole system. We start with the analogs of the open-loop controls. It is natural to assume that at each point x the player can share his/her control. Thus, we consider the distributions of controls. If m * ∈ P 2 (T d ) is an initial distribution of agents, let
be the set of distributions of constant controls of the first player;
denote the set of distributions of measurable controls of the first player;
be the set of distributions of relaxed controls of the first player.
Without loss of generality, we assume that
are the sets of distributions of constant, measurable and relaxed controls of the second player respectively. As above, we have that 
is produced by s, m * and distribution of pairs of controls κ if there exists χ ∈ P 2 (C s,r ) such that
Below we denote the flow of probabilities produced by s, m * and κ by m(·, s, m * , κ).
Feedback strategies and value function Definition 2.2. A feedback strategy of the first player is a function
] a feedback strategy of the second player.
We assume that the players form their controls stepwise. 
Notice that t k is the time of control correction. We denote the set of flows of probabilities produced by t 0 , m 0 , u and ∆ by
, a second player's control v and a sequence of times of control correction ∆ = {t k } N k=0 , one can define the corresponding set of flows of probabilities in the similar way. We denote it by X 2 (t 0 , m 0 , v, ∆).
The the players' outcome can be estimated as follows:
The function Γ 1 (respectively, Γ 2 ) is the upper (respectively, lower) value of the game. Under the imposed condition it is proved (see [7] ) that there exists a value function of the game Γ = Γ 1 = Γ 2 .
To characterize the value function we need the notions of u-and v-stability.
The value function exists and it is simultaneously u-and v-stable.
Remark 2.6. Given a u-stable (respectively, v-stable) function one can construct the suboptimal strategy of the first (respectively, second) player. This is based on the variant of the extremal shift rule for the mean field type differential games (see [7] for details).
Main result
In this section we extend the notion of directional derivatives to functions of probability and formulate the infinitesimal variants of u-and v-stability conditions using this notion.
For
With some abuse of notation, we also denote by Θ τ the operator from
is called a u-derivative of the function ψ at s and η for the radius c.
Analogously 
However, since there is no natural ways to define the set of tangent distribution to
we use only shifts on T d and introduce the special notions. Now, we define analogs of the vectograms. First, for s
The graphs of F 1 and F 2 are introduced as follows. Set
The set F 1 (s, α) (respectively, F 2 (s, β)) plays the role the vectogram for the given distribution of the constant controls of the first (respectively, second) player.
Theorem 3.2. A lower semicontinuous function ψ
• there exists c > 0 such that, for any s
-stable if and only if
where c is constant independent of s and α.
This and Theorem 2.5 immediately imply the following.
Corollary 3.3. A continuous function
ψ : [0, T ] × P 2 (T d ) → R
is a value function of the mean field type differential game if and only if, for any m ∈ P 2 (T d ), g(m) = ψ(T, m) and one can find a constant c > 0 satisfying the following condition: for each s
∈ [0, T ], α ∈ P(T d × U ), β ∈ P(T d × V ), • inf{u-d c ψ(s, η) : η ∈ F 2 (s, β)} ≤ 0; • sup{v-d c ψ(s, η) : η ∈ F 1 (s, α)} ≥ 0.
Flows produced by distribution of constant controls
Below we will consider only the v-stability condition. The case of the u-stability is studied in the similar way.
First, we replace the metric on U . Originally, we consider on U a metric ρ U . Now, let ̟ be a modulus of continuity for f . In particular, for t
Obviously,ρ U is a metric on U and the function f is Lipschitz continuous w.r.t. u in (U,ρ U ). However, we are to prove that the set of Borel probabilities does not change when we change the metric. To this end we prove the following. Proof. Assume that E is open within ρ U . Let u ∈ E and let ε > be such that {u
Conversely, assume that E is open withinρ U . Pick any u ∈ E. There exists ε > 0 such that
Since ̟(δ) + δ → 0 as δ → 0, we have that there exists δ such that, for any δ
Now, let us rewrite the v-stability condition using the probabilities on the set C s,r × U . To this end we need some additional designations. For s, r
flow of probabilities [s, r] ∋ t → m(t) is a motion produced by s, m * and some
. This means that there exists χ ∈ P(C 0,T ) such that m * = m(s) = e s# χ and χ = traj
This implies that, for any t
Introduce the mapping Traj Conversely, assume that there exists a probability ν ∈ P 2 (C s,r × U ) such that conditions 1-3 are fulfilled. Let SOL s,r m(·) denote the set of pairs (x(·), u) ∈ C s,r × U such that x(·) is absolutely continuous and (7) holds for a.e. t ∈ [s, r]. We shall prove that ν is concentrated on SOL s,r m(·) . Indeed, there exists a ν-null set N ⊂ C s,r × U such that, for any (x(·), u) ∈ (C s,r × U ) \ N and any rational t ′ , t ′′ ,
Passing to the limit, we get that (9) for every ( 
Corollary 4.3. A upper semicontinuous functions ψ
2 : [0, T ] × P 2 (T d ) is v-stable iff g(m) ≤ ψ 2 (T, m) and, given s, r ∈ [0, T ], α * ∈ P(T d × U ), there exists ν ∈ P 2 (C s,r × U ) such that 1. e s# ν = α * ; 2. for any t ′ , t ′′ ∈ [s, r],P 2 (Cs,r×U) dist e 1 t ′′ (a) − e 1 t ′ (a), t ′′ t ′ F 1 (t, e 1 t (a), e 1 t # ν, p 2 (a))dt ν(d(a(·))) = 0; 3. ψ 2 (s, e 1 s # ν) ≤ ψ 2 (r, e 1 r # ν).
Properties of the shift operator
Given τ > 0, define the operator Ξ τ :
Notice that the operator Ξ τ can be regarded as an extension of the operator Θ τ defined above. This means that
The following lemmas are concerned with the transfer of distribution of direction determined by the composition operation * defined by (3).
be an optimal plan between α ′ and α, then
Proof. Let us consider the planπ between Ξ θ # (π * η) and Ξ τ # η given by the rule:
Hence, using the Minkowski inequality for the functions φ ′ , φ ′′ :
, defined by the rule:
we conclude that
This implies the conclusion of the lemma.
Recall that L denotes the Lipschitz constant for the function f w.r.t. x and m, whereas ̟ is the modulus of continuity of f w.r.t. t, u and v. Assuming that L ≥ 1 and using the definition of the metricρ U (see (6)), we have that
Proof. By definition of η ′ we have that
To estimate |dist(w,
We have that
Thus, by (11) we obtain that
The opposite inequality is established in the same way. Hence, we get the estimate
This, (12) and the Jensen's inequality yield that
Since π is an optimal plan between α ′ and α we get that the right-hand side of this inequality is equal to ̟(t
This gives the conclusion of the lemma.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Sufficiency
In this section we assume that the upper semicontinuous function
where c is constant independent of t and α.
We aims to prove that in this case ψ 2 is v-stable. To this end given s, r
. Let natural n be such that r − 1/n > s. The proof of sufficiency part is based on the following. 
4.
Choosing k sufficiently large and using Lemma 5.2, we can find τ h,µ ∈ {τ k }, γ h,µ ∈ {γ k } such that
• 3τ h,µ < 1/n;
Denote h
Since ψ 2 is upper semicontinuous, the set K is compact.
) the following inequalities are fulfilled:
The choice of h + h,µ , µ + h,µ and inequalities (13) , (14) yield that
is a cover of K. Let us prove that it is an open cover. To this end we are to show that each set
. Pick η such that conditions (E1)-(E4) are satisfied for (t, α, z) and η. Let π be an optimal plan between α ′ and α. Set η
We have that if
Thus, when
Consequently, picking ε so small that
we get condition (E4) for (t ′ , α ′ , z ′ ) and η ′ . Since {E(h, µ)} is an open cover of K, we can find a finite number of pairs 3 , a 1 = (x 1 (·), u 1 ) ∈ C t 1 ,t 2 × U , a 2 = (x 2 (·), u 2 ) ∈ C t 2 ,t 3 × U . Assume that x 1 (t 2 ) = x 2 (t 2 ), u 1 = u 2 . Concatenation of a 1 , a 2 is a pair a 1 ⊙ a 2 (x(·), u) ∈ C t 1 ,t 3 × U such that u = u 1 = u 2 , whereas
Further, let ν 1 ∈ P 2 (C t 1 ,t 2 × U ), ν 2 ∈ P 2 (C t 2 ,t 3 × U ) satisfy µ ê t 2 # ν 1 =ê t 2 # ν 2 . Let ν 2 (·|y, u) be the disintegration of ν 2 along µ i.e. each ν 2 (·|y, u 2 ) is concentrated on the set of pairs (x 2 (·), u) such that x(t 2 ) = y, u = u 2 and, for any φ ∈ C b (C t 2 ,t 3 × U ), y, u) ).
Define ν 1 ⊙ ν 2 by the rule: for φ ∈ C b (C t 1 ,t 3 × U ), Letting r = r n and passing to the limit when n → ∞, we conclude that η ∈ F 1 (s, α). This and (29) imply the necessity part of the theorem.
